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THE MARYLAND SPEEDY JUDGMENT ACTS
By M. LUTHER PITTMAN*
PURPOSE OF THE ACTS
The Act of 1886, Chapter 184,1 better known as the
Speedy Judgment Act or the Practice Act, established for
Baltimore ,City, and various similar acts since passed have
established for a great many counties of the State,2 a
method for the obtention of summary judgments. Its pur-
pose was to furnish an expeditious method of reducing to
judgment a valid and uncontested claim in cases where the
amount was certain and liquidated, provided the plaintiff
in bringing his action had strictly complied with its terms.'
To carry out the purpose of the act and as further as-
surance to the plaintiff of a speedy judgment, it is pro-
vided that the defendant in filing pleas must make oath
to the amount admitted or disputed and must be advised
by counsel that he has a good legal defense ;4 and that the
plaintiff shall be entitled to a counsel fee if the claim is
contested and the plaintiff successfully prosecutes his suit.5
* LL.B., 1925, University of Maryland School of Law. Clerk, Superior
Court of Baltimore City.
I Code, Public Local Laws of Maryland (Flack, 1930) Art. IV, Secs 312-
318, referred to herein as Act.
2 This article deals primarily with the Speedy Judgment Act for Bal-
timore City. The various county acts are substantially similar. Citations
to them are collected herein in an Appendix which includes a cross-ref-
erence table showing, in terms of the divisions of the Baltimore City
Act, the comparable sections of the various county Acts. To the extent
to which the Act for a given county contains the same terminology as the
Baltimore City Act, an interpretation of the latter will be binding for the
former.
8 "The object of the Act was, in cases to which it applied, to obtain
from both the plaintiff and the defendant a definite and sworn statement
of both the claim and the defense (if any), so that the parties might
know exactly wherein they differed and shape their action accordingly."
Adler v. Crook, 68 Md. 494, 498, 13 Atl. 153 (1888).
'Act, Sec. 312.
Act, Sec. 315.
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These subjects will be discussed under appropriate head-
ings.
The Speedy Judgment Act, the Court of Appeals has
said, is "designed to expedite the enforcement of valid
claims, but not to preclude a meritorious defense reason-
ably interposed in substantial compliance with its terms".'
CONSTRUCTION OF THE ACT
The Act is strictly construed, and requires the plain-
tiff to file his "cause of action" with the suit. If the cause
of action is a bond, promissory note, contract, or something
similar, the original or a photostatic copy thereof7 must
be filed, and if it is a verbal or implied promise to pay,
a full, complete and itemized statement of the charges or a
full bill of particulars thereof must be filed with the suit
at the time of the bringing or institution thereof.8  How-
ever, the courts will not adopt any construction of the
statute which would defeat its purpose,' or prevent the
Courts from "serving the obvious ends of Justice".1°
SUITS UNDER THE ACT
The following requirements are essential for suits
brought under the Act.
1. The action must be based upon a claim for liquidated
damages.
2. The defendant's liability must appear upon the face
of the cause of action.
3. The cause of action must be filed with the declara-
tion, and furnish a standard or means of arriving at the
defendant's liability, and must be of sufficient particularity
to support a summary judgment.
4. The action must be one which can be properly veri-
fied by affidavit as to the amount and the correctness thereof.
Liquidated damages are those whose amount has been
determined by agreement between the parties.11 "Where a
6 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Rozier, 152 Md. 268, 271, 136 At. 636 (1927).
7 Act, Sec. 313-A, added by Md. Acts, 1931, Ch. 102.
OAct, Sec. 313.
o Gemmell v. Davis, 71 Md. 458, 18 Atl. 455 (1889).
20 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Rozier, supra note 6.
12 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 2023.
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precise sum for damages is not agreed upon, and it is not
the essence of the contract between the parties, the quantum
of damages is unliquidated, and it is for a jury to assess
them; but where the precise sum has been fixed and agreed
upon by the parties, that sum is ascertained and liqui-
dated." 2
Damages for services or charges where the valuation
depends upon an opinion by the party suing, or where evi-
dence must be taken to prove value are not such as can be
claimed under the act. The reasonable value of such ser-
vice or of such charge is the measure of damages. Thus
the claim of a lawyer for professional services where no
definite sum has been agreed upon is a claim for unliqui-
dated damages."3
THE ACCOUNT OR CAUSE OF ACTION
To obtain the benefit of the statute, the account, if the
action is based upon an implied or verbal contract, must be
filed with the declaration"4 and must show on its face the
liability of the defendant, or must furnish the standard or
means of arriving at such liability. The same rule applies
when the suit is filed upon a bond, bill of exchange, note or
other instrument in writing." Unless the account or other
cause of action filed with the declaration conforms to these
requirements, the Court has no jurisdiction to enter judg-
ment."6
The filing of cause of action is required only as a con-
dition to a speedy judgment. The absence of documents,
if proper pleas are filed, is without effect; the filing of such
pleas avoids judgment.' It is not necessary that the cause
of action filed with the declaration be annexed thereto, or
endorsed by the clerk as filed.'"
Chapter 102 of the Acts of 19311' provides that in lieu
of filing the original bond, bill of exchange, promissory
12 Smithson v. L. S. Telegraph Co., 29 Md. 162, 166 (1868) ; De Atley v.
Senior, 55 Md. 479 (1880).
18 Steuart v. Chappell, 98 Md. 527, 57 Atl. 17 (1904).
"Act, Sec. 313.
25 Ibid.
16 McDonald v. King, 125 Md. 589, 593, 93 Atl. 979 (1915).
17 Slicing Machine Co., Inc. v. Murphy, 161 Md. 667, 158 Atl. 26 (1931).
18 Loney v. Bailey, 43 Md. 10 (1875).
"L Act, Sec. 313-A.
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note, or other writing or account by which the defendant is
indebted, the plaintiff may file a photostatic copy thereof,
if affidavit is made by the plaintiff or someone on his behalf
that such photostatic copy is a true copy of the original
cause of action. The court or the defendant may demand
the production of the original before the entry of judgment.
Causes of action have been held sufficient in the following
cases:
1. Policy of marine insurance0 or fire insurance ;21
2. An account for the statutory liability of a stock-
holder when the account stated dates and amounts of all
deposits with credit for the money withdrawn ;22
3. A bill of lading that expressly stipulated for the
payment of demurrage at a certain rate per day ;23
4. A contract incorporated in the declaration ;24
'5. An account for "brokers commissions for effecting
sale to E. G. G. for $2,500.00 of a one-half interest in E.
Lunchroom, No. 1057 Hillen Street, Baltimore City, $175.00,
with interest from August 1, 1925 ;25
6. In a suit upon open account, a properly itemized bill
of particulars showing the name of the party charged, the
date, each purchase and the amount thereof properly item-
ized, credits, etc., and the total amount due.2"
In the following cases the cause of action has been held
insufficient:
1. An account for balance due, unless the items com-
prising such balance are set out in detail.2
2. "To amount of account rendered. '28
3. "To cash money received from the plaintiff., 29
4. Contents of a paper not produced. 0
20 Orient Mutual Ins. Co. v. Andrews and Locke, 66 Md. 371, 7 Atl. 693
(1886).
21Continental Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 107 Md. 96, 68 Atl. 277 (1907);
Girard v. Bankard, 107 Md. 538, 69 Atl. 415 (1908).
2 Coulbourn Bros. v. Boulton, 100 Md. 350, 59 Atl. 711 (1905).
23 Jones v. Freeman, 29 Md. 273 (1868).
24 Smith v. Hallwood Register Co., 97 Md. 354, 55 Atl. 525 (1903).
25 Lipscomb v. Zink, 151 Md. 430, 435, 135 Atl. 182 (1926).
26 Lansburgh v. Fish & Oyster Co., 153 Md. 312, 138 Atl. 269 (1927).
7 Thillman v. Shadrick, 69 Md. 528, 16 Atl. 138 (1888).
" Wilhelm v. Mitchell, 131 Md. 358, 101 Atl. 785 (1917).
29 Mueller v. Michaels, 101 Md. 188, 60 Atl. 485 (1905).
"0 Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Brown, 77 Md. 64, 74, 25 Atl. 989, 27 Al.
314, 39 Am. St. Rep. 386 (1893) ; see also Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 102
Md. 662, 62 At. 799 (1906).
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5. Bonds with collateral conditions on which sureties
are responsible only for the default of their principal in the
discharge of official duties."
6. Improperly certified copy of judgment. 2
THE AFFIDAVITS
An affidavit is required when filing the declaration, the
pleas and demurrers. No affidavit is required to any
pleading subsequent to the pleas, as the case then proceeds
as any other common law action. Affidavits are not re-
quired to demands for particulars.
1. Affidavit to Declaration
The plaintiff or someone on his behalf, must, at the time
of bringing suit, make oath to, or affirm the true amount of
the defendant's indebtedness to the plaintiff over and above
all discounts.13 The true amount is the amount actually
due and owing at the time suit is instituted. The affidavit
of the plaintiff, or on behalf of the plaintiff must comply
strictly with the terms of the act."
The affidavit can be taken before any one authorized to
take affidavits.8 Thus if the affidavit is made outside of
the United States, it must be taken before a Consul or Vice-
Consul. If it be taken before a Justice of the Peace of an-
other State, a proper certificate must be attached showing
that the Justice is a duly commissioned and qualified officer.
The essentials of an affidavit under the act are embodied
in the opinion in the case of DeAtley v. Senior."6 The affi-
davit and the bill of particulars filed with the declaration
should agree as to amount. 7 An individual plaintiff must
make the affidavit on his own behalf, unless he be absent
from the State, and in such case it can be made by his duly
authorized agent.8 When the plaintiff is a corporation the
81 State use of Bouldin v. Steibel, 31 Md. 34 (1869) ; see also Keen et al.
v. Whittington & Co., 40 Md. 489 (1874).
: Musher v. Perera, 162 Md. 44, 158 AtI. 14 (1932).
Act, Sec. 313.
1, Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hoeske, 32 Md. 317 (1869).
'5 Under Md. Code, Art. 9, Sec. 5.
Supra note 12.
7 Griffith v. Graham, 1 B. C. R. 204 (1891).
8BAct, Sec. 313.
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affidavit must be made by the proper officer. 9 A cashier of
a bank is competent to make the affidavit on behalf of the
bank.4" A bookkeeper is not a proper person to make the
affidavit. 1
It is not necessary that the affidavit claim interest when
the account or other cause of action shows on its face that
interest is due and the date from which it can be calculated,
nor to state the amount of protest fees when the protest is
filed and shows the amount of such fees.
42
Interest should be claimed when the cause of action does
not show on its face that interest is due, and such interest
should be claimed in the affidavit on the original amount
due and should date from the time the right thereto begins.
When a case under the act goes to trial the affidavit for
that purpose loses its force and effect, because the affidavit
is no part of the pleading, and if the affidavit states that the
cause of action is a promissory note, when the cause of
action is an open account, this does not preclude the plain-
tiff from recovery upon trial. The Act of 1914, Chapter
378, restricts a plaintiff to the bill of particulars filed, and
makes it a part of the pleading; but the affidavit not being
a part of the pleading, the case would proceed as any other
case ex-contractu. 4' The affidavit should not be submitted
to the jury.44
2. Affdavit to Pleas
Pleas with an affidavit of defense must be made and filed
within fifteen days from the return day to which the de-
fendant is returned summoned, unless the court for good
cause shown before the time for pleading has expired,
passes its order in writing extending the time in which to
file pleas. The affidavit must aver that every plea so
pleaded is true, and the amount, if any, that is due and
owing, and the amount disputed, and state further that the
39 Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hoeske, supra note 34;
Power v. Asphalt Products Corp., 162 Md. 175, 159 Atl. 251 (1932).
40 Parkhurst v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 61 Md. 254 (1884).
41 De Atley v. Senior, 8upra note 12.
11 Canton Nat. Building Asso. v. Weber, 34 Md. 669 (1871).
4" Councilman v. Towson Bank, 103 Md. 469, 64 Atl. 358 (1906).
" Ingalls and Wright v. Couch and Creary, 35 Md. 296 (1872).
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defendant believes that he will be able at the trial thereof to
produce sufficient evidence to support said pleas."
The affidavit must state to what part of the plaintiff's
claim it applies.4 An affidavit that the defendant does not
admit any of the plaintiff's claim to be due and owing is not
such a denial as required by the act ;47 but an affidavit stat-
ing that all is disputed is good.48 Therefore, an affidavit to
be proper in form should state that no part of the plaintiff's
claim is due and owing, and the whole thereof is disputed,
if such be the case. If, however, a part of the claim is ad-
mitted, the affidavit must state the exact amount thereof, as
well as the exact amount in dispute. The omission to do
this will render the pleas fatally defective and a judgment
by default for want of sufficient affidavit of defense will be
entered upon motion.49
If there is more than one defendant, either of the de-
fendants may make the affidavit on behalf of all, being care-
ful to use the plural."
If a partnership or an incorporation of the parties is
alleged in the declaration, such allegation is taken as ad-
mitted for the purpose of the case, unless the same is denied
in the affidavit at the time of filing pleas.5 The same provi-
sion applies to the denial of the signature where any paper
purporting to be signed by the defendant is filed with the
declaration. 2 It has been held that an affidavit denying
signatures to the note sued on, if broad enough to include
all of the defendants, is good, even though it fails to state
in terms that none are genuine.53
After the specified time for filing an affidavit has
elapsed it cannot be amended to deny the genuineness of a
,5 Act, Sec. 312. The forms of the various affidavits can be found In
2 Poe, Pleading & Practice (Tiffany's Ed.) 401-4.
4' Adler v. Crook, supra note 3; Gemmell v. Davis, supra note 9.
4' Balto. Publishing Co. v. Hooper, 75 Md. 115, 24 AtI. 452 (1892).
48 Codd Company v. Parker, 97 Md. 319, 55 Atl. 623 (1903).
41 Adler v. Crook, supra note 3.8 0 Deved v. Carrington. 98 Md. 376. 56 Atl. 818 (1904).
5'Thorne v. Fox, 67 Md. 67, 8 Ati. 667 (1887); National Bldg. Co. v.
Gosnell, 116 Md. 640, 82 At. 557 (1911).
52 Farmers, Etc., Bank v. Hunter, 97 Md. 148, 54 Atl. 650 (1903); Homer
v. Plumley, 97 Md. 271, 54 Atl. 971 (1903); Commonwealth Bank v. Kirk-
land, 102 Md. 662, 62 AtI. 799 (1906) ; Nicholson v. Snyder, 97 Md. 415, 55
AtI. 484 (1903).
83 Nicholson v. Snyder, supra note 52.
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signature. 4 A comparison of the case so holding "5 with the
case of Commercial Credit Corp. v. Rozier,56 proves to be
an interesting study. In the latter case a plea denying
signature was filed before the time for pleading had elapsed,
but the signature was not denied in the affidavit. The court
said: "That drastic result would be produced merely be-
cause the defense of forgery, though stated in a plea under
oath, was not set forth in the affidavit by which the plea is
verified." In that case Chief Judge Bond and Judge Parke
dissented.
The two cases are distinctly different, however. In the
former case the time for pleading and filing an affidavit had
elapsed, and a denial of the signature was not pleaded, nor
was such denial made in the affidavit, while in the latter
case the plea of forgery was specially pleaded within the
time limited by the act, although omitted in the affidavit.
Judge Urner's opinion cautions the pleader that such an
averment should properly be included in the affidavit.
This opinion modifies the rule as laid down in Gemell v.
Davis,' "that an affidavit that does not comply with the
act will not be a bar to a judgment, although the pleas them-
selves are good".
If suit is brought under the terms of the act, pleas are
absolute nullities unless accompanied by an affidavit and
certificate of counsel. 8 Pleas and affidavit filed after the
time for pleading has expired are likewise nullities, unless
the court for good cause shown has extended the time in
which to file pleas and affidavit.59
An affidavit is not required to pleas where the declara-
tion has been substantially amended, as such an amendment
takes the case out of the act.6" An affidavit is required to
a plea in abatement, unless such a plea is inconsistent with
other pleas and the affidavit. 1 "If there be any reason why
", Commercial Credit Corp. v. Schuck, 151 Md. 367, 134 Atl. 349 (1926).
55 Ibid.56 Supra note 6, 152 Md. 268, 271.
57 Supra note 9.
58 Griffith v. Adams, 95 Md. 170, 52 At]. 66 (1902) ; Waldeck Co. v. Em-
mart, 127 Md. 470, 96 Atl. 634 (1916).
59 Gemmell v. Davis, supra note 9.
'0 Mueller v. Michaels, supra note 29.
" Hyson v. Gen. Fireproof Sup. Co., 117 Md. 230, 83 Atl. 244 (1912).
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the defendant cannot make the required affidavit until after
his pleas in abatement are disposed of, or if justice demands
that he be not required to file the affidavit until after that
time, the statute62 furnishes ample protection, by providing
that the court for good cause shown, may, by its order in
writing passed at any time before judgment, extend the
time for filing pleas and affidavit, which extension, shall ex-
tend until the expiration thereof the plaintiff's right to
enter judgment under this section." 6
If the affidavit denies the genuineness of the signature
it is not necessary to specially plead such denial.6 " Pleas
filed by a corporation must be verified under oath by some
natural person capable of making an affidavit.6 5 To test
the sufficiency of the affidavit to pleas, the plaintiff should
refuse to join issue thereon and suffer a judgment.66
DEMURRERS AND AFFIDAVITS THERETO
The Act of 1920 required that there should be affidavits
to demurrers, and made the demurrer a subject of special
pleading.' It was amended in 1927 as follows:
"In all jurisdictions where provision has been made
or shall be made for the obtention of speedy judgments,
wherever a defendant files a demurrer to the declara-
tion filed under such speedy judgment act, said de-
murrer shall not be received unless the defendant shall
state the specific gronnds for the demurrer, and unless
the defendant or someone on his behalf shall, under
oath or affirmation, state that the said demurrer is not
filed for the purpose of delay, and that he is advised
by counsel to file said demurrer, and such demurrer
shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel that he
so advised the party filing said demurrer." 6s
This act requires of the defendant the same particularity
in demurring as is required of him in pleading. The provi-
sions of the act requiring the specific grounds for the de-
"Act, Sec. 312.63 Lipscomb v. Zink, supra note 25, 151 Md. 430, 437.
61 Farmers, Etc., Bank v. Hunter, supra note 52.
6' Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hoeske, supra note 34.66 See Traber v. Traber, 50 Md. 1 (1878).
67 Md. Acts 1920, Ch. 684; Md. Code, Art. 75, See. 9.6 6 Md. Acts 1927, Ch. 525; Md. Code Supp., Art. 75, Sec. 9.
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murrer, and the sufficiency of such grounds have been very
ably discussed in the case of Shpritz v. Baltimore Trust
Co. 9 . Inter alia this case holds that a demurrer that states
that a particular allegation of the declaration is bad plead-
ing does not satisfy the act.
Judge Frank, before whom the case was tried below, held
that a pleading may be bad for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing duplicity, departure, non-joinder, and misjoinder.
Therefore, the assertion that a pleading or a part of it is
bad pleading does not state the specific grounds for the
demurrer, since the bad pleading may be due to so many
different grounds of error, and to fulfill the requirement
of the statute, the specific vice which renders the pleading
or the portion thereof bad must be indicated. This view
was approved on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
The allegation that a declaration "is bad in substance
and insufficient in law" is likewise bad in that it gives no
special reason for the demurrer, nor does it point out a spe-
cific error or vice in the declaration.
Although a demurrer is a pleading, it is not a plea.7"
Therefore, if a judgment is stricken out and the time is ex-
tended for filing of pleas, this does not allow or justify a
demurrer, and the court has the right to limit the defenses
to such as may be presented by pleas.71 It is absolutely
necessary when filing a demurrer to secure an extension of
time in which to plead, otherwise, the demurrer will not
prevent a judgment by default.72
When a demurrer is filed to the whole declaration, and
one count is good, it is properly overruled, and if a declara-
tion contains a special count and the common counts in
proper form, a demurrer to the whole declaration will like-
wise be overruled."
In dealing with a demurrer to the nar and each and every
count thereof, the Court of Appeals held in Rosenthal v.
Heft,"4 that:
6- 151 Md. 503, 135 AtI. 369 (1926).
70 Baltimore City v. Thomas, 115 Md. 212, 80 Atl. 726 (1911).
71 Cornblatt v. Block, 132 Md. 44, 103 Atl. 137 (1918).
72 Ibid.
71 Gunther v. Dranbaner, 86 Md. 1, 38 Atl. 33 (1897); Mutual Fire Ins.
Co. v. Owen, 148 Md. 257, 129 At. 214 (1925).
71155 Md. 410, 423, 142 Atl. 598 (1928).
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"Inasmuch as the six common counts are in the com-
mon stereotyped form, the objection to the whole nar
must necessarily fall, unless they are vitiated by the
bill of particulars, or the documents offered in answer
to the demand for oyer, or unless, because of the char-
acter of the seventh count, there has been a misjoinder
of actions. But since the bill of particulars is a mere
statement of the items of the plaintiff's claim, while
it limited the proof that might be offered under them, it
certainly did not make them bad . .. It is not appar-
ent how the common counts were vitiated by the profert
of the deed and agreements. The action was not
brought on the deed itself nor upon the agreement, but
upon the parol promise, implied from . . . acceptance
of the deed."
A declaration, including the common counts, is tested by
the sufficiency of the cause of action if a demurrer is filed
to the whole declaration.75
AMENDMENTS
Any material or substantial amendment to the cause of
action as originally filed will take the case out of the opera-
tion of the Speedy Judgment Acts.
If the account or other cause of action filed with the
declaration at the time the suit is brought, is not in itself
sufficient to satisfy the act in regard to the bill of particu-
lars, the plaintiff is not entitled to a summary judgment
by default; and if the suit is later amended by filing a
proper bill of particulars after a demand by the defendant,
the amendment suspends the operation of the act, and the
defendant is no longer required to plead under oath.7"
The addition of new parties as either plaintiff or defend-
ant, or an amendment to the declaration as originally filed,
by adding new counts, or striking out counts embodied in
the declaration at the time suit is instituted, will remove
the case from the operation of the act. If the amendment
is made for some reason other than one involving the cause
of action, it is not necessary in filing an amended declara-
tion also to re-file the account, note, bill of particulars or
75 Speed v. Bailey, 153 Md. 655, 139 Atl. 534 (1927).
7 Mueller v. Michaels, supra note 29.
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other evidence of indebtedness. In other words, if the suit
be on a contract and the contract is filed at the time of
bringing suit, but the declaration is bad for some reason not
touching the contract, such as mis-joinder or non-joinder
of parties, and the suit is amended for this reason, it is not
necessary to re-file the contract with the amended declara-
tion."'
The Act of 1914,"s requiring a bill of particulars to be
treated as a part of the pleading does not affect the right to
amend."e The action of the trial court in allowing a de-
fendant to file new pleas and affidavit, and extending the
time for filing the same is within its discretion, and if the
new pleas and affidavit are filed within the extension of time
no appeal will lie therefrom. 0 Unless the amendment
makes some change from the original, the pleas do not have
to be re-filed.
THE COMMON COUNTS
The word "common" is far too appropriate in connec-
tion with the common counts, because their use, or rather,
the use of all of them is entirely too general and frequent.
Their use should be restricted to the applicability of the
count to the cause of action. When all the counts are used
and the cause of action is applicable to only one count, a
demand for particulars is usually made and granted, result-
ing in an amendment which removes the case from the
operation of the act. For a number of years the law dockets
of the common law courts have been clogged with exceptions
to demands for particulars of the common counts and this
could be easily avoided by the use of the proper count or
counts.
The prefix, "For money payable by the defendant to the
plaintiff", is absolutely necessary in the use of the common
counts. The lack of such an averment is fatal to the decla-
ration on demurrer.8'
77 Abbott v. Bowers, 98 Md. 525, 57 Atl. 508 (1904).
78 Md. Acts 1914, Cb. 378; Md. Code, Art. 75, See. 28 (107).
71 Poland v. Chessler, 145 Md. 66, 125 Atl. 536 (1923).8 0 Horner v. Plumley, 97 Md. 271, 54 Atl. 971 (1903).
1 Poe, Pleading and Practice (Tiffany's Ed.), Sec, 94; Merryman v.
Rider, Ex'x., 34 Md. 98 (1871).
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Mr. Poe in his work on pleading has, with the thorough-
ness characteristic of him, set out in detail each of the
counts and what may be recovered under each, and further
reference to them is unnecessary here, except to mention
their use on a fully performed contract. Where an express
contract exists which has been fully performed and nothing
remains but to pay the contract price, the common counts
or such of them as are applicable may be used instead of a
special count on the contract. This is optional with the
pleader, and if the counts are used, a fully itemized account
must be filed.82
I A demurrer to the Common Counts has been permitted
when such counts are particularized by the supporting
papers required under the Speedy Judgment Act.8
DEMAND FOR PARTICULARS AND ANSWER
It is the right of either party to demand a bill of par-
ticulars if the pleading is so general that it does not apprise
the opposing party of the claim or defense against him with
the particularity required. The claim of the plaintiff must
be so particularized as to enable the defendant to intelli-
gently plead. If the pleas of the defendant are the general
issue pleas, or a special plea, or both, and do not indicate
the evidence to be offered in support of them, then the plain-
tiff can demand particulars of the defense.
The mere demand for particulars does not enlarge the
defendant's time to plead and does not suspend the entry of
judgment to which the plaintiff is otherwise entitled." The
defendant, to prevent judgment, must secure from the Court
an order in writing enlarging the time in which to file pleas,
and notice of such order must be given to the plaintiff."5 If,
however, the defendant pleads before a rule for a bill of
particulars has been complied with, he waives his right to
require a compliance with the rule.8
as 1 Poe, Pleading and Practice (Tiffany's Ed.), 102; Motoramp Garage
v. Booker, Daily Record, June 15, 1937, Op. by Frank, J.
Speed v. Bailey, supra note 75.
s' Lipscomb v. Zink, supra note 25.
85 Rule No. 49, Baltimore City Common Law Courts.
" Wilkin Mnfg. Co. v. Melvin, 116 Md. 97, 81 Atl. 879 (1911).
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The bill of particulars, whether filed at the time of filing
the declaration, or filed in answer to the demand, becomes
under the Act of 1914,7 a part of the pleadings, and limits
the plaintiff in his evidence to the proof of the items set out
therein. Before the Act of 1914 the plaintiff could prove
anything provable under his declaration and was not re-
stricted to his particulars. 8 The strictness of this Act is
illustrated in the following instances:
In an account that did not contain an item for loss of
profits, the plaintiff was not allowed to recover profits.89
In the case of Rullman v. Rullman,0 the seventh count of
the declaration alleged that the cause of action was a prom-
ise under seal, when the cause of action was an agreement
in the nature of an equitable mortgage under seal to secure
the payment of a pre-existing debt, but containing no cove-
nant for the payment of such debt. Ignoring the allegation
of the seventh count of the declaration, the court looked to
the cause of action filed and considered it a part of the
pleading for the purpose of determining whether the cause
Of action was a promise under seal, as alleged, and regarded
it as an action on an implied contract."
Prior to the case of Baltimore Trust Co. v. Roth,92 in
which general issue pleas were filed, demands for particu-
lars of pleas, particularly general issue pleas, were unheard
of. Since this decision it is seldom that particulars of the
pleas are not demanded. The Court said, speaking through
Judge Parke:
"The cause at bar is an illustration of the necessity
for the laying of a rule for a bill of particulars of de-
fense. . . . The furnishing of the particulars of de-
fense does not relieve the plaintiff of the necessity of
supporting his demand by proof."
COUNSEL FEE
If an action be brought under the terms of the speedy
judgment act and the plaintiff is successful in recovering
1' Md. Acts 1914, Ch. 378; Code, Art. 75, Sec. 28 (107).
8 See Newbold v. Green, 122 Md. 648, 90 Atl. 513 (1914).
Aitz Chaim Cong. v. Butterhoff, 141 Md. 267, 118 Atl. 658 (1922).90 148 Md. 140, 129 Atl. 7 (1925).
91 See also Power v. Asphalt Products Corp., 162 Md. 175, 159 Ati. 251
(1932).
92161 Md. 340, 346, 350, 158 Atl. 32 (1931).
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a judgment for any part of his claim that is disputed, he is
entitled to a counsel fee of not less than $25.00 nor more
than $100.00 in the discretion of the court. 3
The counsel fee is not imposed as special compensation
to the plaintiff, but is a special allowance to discourage bad
pleas."4 The fee will not be allowed the plaintiff when the
obligation on which the defendant was indebted was not
filed with the declaration. 5 A counsel fee is not a part of
the judgment, but an incident to it, and if the judgment be
stricken out the fee falls with it.96 Where a demurrer was
filed to the nar and heard by the trial court it was held to be
a trial of the case such as to justify a counsel fee.9
An amendment of 19088 provides that in cases under the
act where there shall be a verdict for the defendant, the de-
fendant in addition to his costs shall be allowed a reasonable
counsel fee, the amount of which is the same as allowed the
plaintiff. It will be noticed that the statute granting a fee
to the plaintiff requires a judgment, while the statute allow-
ing a fee to the defendant requires a verdict. Plaintiff can-
not deliberately or voluntarily amend to prevent defend-
ant's counsel fee.9
RuLE SECURITY FOR COSTS
If the plaintiff be a non-resident of the State of Mary-
land, the defendant may lay a rule security for costs against
him, which rule must be complied with by the second day of
the next term, or the suit will be subject to a judgment of
non pros upon motion. The sum of $25.00 is the usual
amount deposited to cover such costs, and this sum is usu-
ally accepted unless the defendant has good reason to be-
lieve that the costs will be more. This rule cannot be in-
voked as a ground for having the time in which to plead
extended °10
9:Md. Acts 1890, Ch. 433; Act, Sec. 315.
Singer v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 96 Md. 221, 54 At. 63 (1903).
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Murray, 111 Md. 600, 75 Atl. 348 (1909).
"Singer v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., supra note 94.
:7 Cornblatt v. Block, supra note 71.
8 Md. Acts 1908, Ch. 644, Act, Sec. 315A.
:1 Perper v. Schoen, Baltimore City Court, Daily Record, Apr. 19, 1931.
100 Wilkin Mnfg. Co. v. Melvin, supra note 86.
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JUDGMENTS
The plaintiff is entitled to judgment, unless the defend-
ant within fifteen days from the return day to which he has
been summoned files pleas as required by the act supported
by affidavit.1 1
I To secure the benefits of this act the plaintiff must do
what the act requires of him ;"02 but a plaintiff does not have
to produce all the evidence by which his claim might be
proved to be entitled to a judgment. 03
The plaintiff has an absolute right to judgment by de-
fault when pleas have been filed, if the pleas do not meet
the requirements of the act, but this right is waived if the
plaintiff files a replication to such pleas.-0 4 He is likewise
entitled to judgment when the affidavit of the defendant does
not state what part of the claim is admitted and what part
is disputed. °5
A copy of the declaration must be served upon each
party defendant or the plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment
under the act ;"'6 but it is not necessary to file a copy of the
cause of action for service on the defendant with a copy of
the declaration.'
The plaintiff need not make known to the defendant his
intention to take judgment,0 8 and the court may assess the
damages without the aid of a jury."9 After a judgment by
default is once rendered, all presumptions are in favor of its
correctness.n
If a joint judgment is desired where several defendants
are sued in the same action, and one of them is returned
summoned to one return day, and another to another return
101 Sanborn and Mann v. Mullen, 77 Md. 480, 26 At. 872 (1893) ; Act, Sec.
312.
102 Lipscomb v. Zink, supra note 25; Fick v. Towers, 152 Md. 335, 136
Atl. 648 (1927).
103 Wilhelm v. Mitchell, supra note 28.
10, Wilkin Mnfg. Co. v. Melvin, supra note 86.
105 Baltimore v. Hooper, 76 Md. 115 (1892); Codd Company v. Parker,
97 Md. 319, 55 Ati. 623 (1903).
106 Fick v. Towers, supra note 102.
107 Commonwealth v. Schwaber, Superior Court of Baltimore City, Daily
Record, May 8th, 1933.
101 Gemmell v. Davis, supra note 9.
109 Norris v. Wrenschall, 34 Md. 492 (1871) ; Act, Sec. 314.
120 Coulbourn Bros. v. Boulton, supra note 22.
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day, and so on, the proper way to secure a joint judgment
against all is to take an interlocutory judgment against each
defendant as he is brought in and defaulted, and then take
one final judgment by inquisition against all."'
This practice becomes particularly important when a
man and his wife own property as tenants by the entirety
and are sued jointly, one of them being summoned to one
return day the other to another return day. If the judg-
ment is secured in the manner shown above an execution
may issue against property held by the entireties . 1 2
Judgment for Amount Admitted in Affidavit to Pleas
Under an amendment made in 1894,113 when an affidavit
to the pleas admits part of the plaintiff's claim to be due
and owing, the plaintiff must take judgment for such
amount, or the defendant is not bound thereby."1
If the amount admitted is insufficient to establish juris-
diction, the plaintiff can take judgment for such amount
and await the trial, and if he obtains a judgment upon trial
for the balance in dispute, both judgments can be combined
for the purpose of an execution." 5 If the plaintiff is unsuc-
cessful at the trial for the amount in dispute he still main-
tains his judgment for the amount admitted and can proceed
in accordance with the provisions of the Code. 6
Motion to Strike Out Judgme-nts
In Baltimore City it is necessary to make a motion to
strike out a judgment within thirty days from the rendition
of the judgment, if the grounds for such motion be other
" Loney v. Bailey, supra note 18.
'112 Frey v. McGaw, 127 Md. 23, 95 Atl. 969 (1915); See also Wilmer
Trustee v. Gaither, 68 Md. 342, 349, 12 AtI. 8, 12 Atl. 253 (1887) ; West-
heimer v. Craig, 76 Md. 399, 25 Atl. 419 (1892) ; Jordan v. Reynolds, 105
Md. 288, 66 At. 37, 121 Am. St. Rep. 578 (1907).
":-Md. Acts, 1894, Ch. 173; Act, Sec. 312.
" 'Sisters of Notre Dame v. Kusnitt, 125 Md. 323, 341, 93 Atl. 928 (1915);
National Bldg. Co. v. Gosnell, 116 Md. 640, 82 Atl. 557 (1911); Lauch-
heimer v. Naill, 88 Md. 174, 40 Atl. 888 (1898) : Smith v. Woman's Medical
College, 110 Md. 441, 72 At. 1107 (1909) ; Legum v. Blank, 105 Md. 126,
65 At. 1071 (1907) ; Standard Mtr. Co. v. Schockey, 139 Md. 127, 114 At.
869 (1921).
" Act, Sec. 312.
11 Md. Code, Art. 26, Sec. 17.
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than fraud, deceit or irregularity."7  The motion rests in
the sound discretion of the court, and if the court is of the
opinion that the ends of justice will be promoted by striking
,out such judgment and placing the same on the trial calen-
,dar, such a judgment will be stricken out. In such a case
the defendant will be granted ten days within which to
file his pleas and affidavit of defense; but before striking
out the judgment the court can impose upon the defendant
the costs to date, or require a bond to satisfy any judgment
rendered."' The practice of opening judgments for the
purpose of trial, retaining the lien of the judgment, is an
approved and established practice in this State."' It is
improper however, to strike out a judgment on an ex-parte
affidavit.'
NOTICE TO PLEAD
Every declaration filed under the Speedy Judgment Act
should contain a notice to the defendant to plead. Although
the Act itself makes no provision for such notice, Judge
Stein in a trial court opinion in the case of Foreman v. Fi-
delity,' held that such notice was necessary.
SERVICE OF COPIES
Approving the decision in May v. Wolverington,'22 the
Court of Appeals held in Fick v. Towers2 that "the said
act does not provide for a copy of the declaration to be
served on the.defendant when he is summoned, yet a plain-
tiff is not entitled to a judgment unless a copy of the decla-
ration is first served on the defendant".
Rule 9 of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City provides
that a copy of the declaration be served on each defendant.
If there are seven defendants in a suit, the clerk of the
court in which the declaration is filed should be furnished
117 Sec. 315B, City Charter of 1927; Cornblatt v. Block, siupra note 71;
Act, Sec. 315B.
118 Mueller v. Michaels, supra note 29; Waldeck v. Emmart, 127 Md. 474),
96 Atl. 634 (1915).
119 Taylor v. Gorman, 146 Md. 207, 126 Atl. 897 (1924).
120 Johnson v. Phillips, 143 Md. 16, 122 Atl. 7 (1923).
121 Daily Record, June 9. 1925.
69 Md. 117, 14 Atl. 706 (1888).
'Supra note 102.
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with seven copies thereof so that a copy can be served on
each defendant.
A copy of the affidavit should also be served on the de-
fendant so that he may know that the suit is under the Act.
4t is not necessary that the copy of the affidavit should be
executed. The Act, however, does not require that a copy
of the affidavit be served on the defendant, 124 and the sug-
gestion above is made to promote careful pleading, and is in
keeping with the decisions requiring the service of notices
and declarations.
PLEAS
The act provides that the plaintiff shall be entitled to a
judgment in fifteen days after the return day of the writ
gnless the defendant shall file pleas under oath stating that
the pleas are true, that he is advised by counsel to file pleas,
and further, what amount of the plaintiff's claim is due and
owing, if any, and what part is disputed." Pleas in them-
selves, or pleas without a proper affidavit, do not comply
with the act, and will be no bar to a judgment.
A plea filed after the lapse of the fifteen days given to
the defendant to plead, without a prior order of court al-
lowing the pleas to be filed, or pleas not under affidavit as
the act requires, are mere nullities.' 26 Likewise, a plea is
bad when the affidavit attached thereto does not state the
amount admitted and the amount disputed. It is not suffi-
cient that the affidavit state that the pleas are true. Such
errors in a plea or an affidavit are waived by the filing of a
replication, and if the plaintiff files a replication he loses
his right to a judgment." 7
Special pleas, although proper in themselves, if filed
after a motion for judgment by default for want of proper
pleas, will not defeat the plaintiff's right to judgment if the
time for pleading has expired, unless the Court passes an
order in writing extending the time in which to file pleas.28
1=- Greff v. Fickey, 30 Md. 75 (168).
1' Act, Sec. 312.
"6 Griffith v. Adams, 95 Md. 170, 52 Atl. 66 (1902).
27 Hutton & Co. v. Marx, 69 Md. 252, 14 Atl. 684 (1888): Gemmell v.
Davis, 8upra note 9; Wilkin Mfg. Co. v. Melvin, supra note 86.
1 Waldeck v. Emmart, 127 Md. 470, 96 Atl. 634 (1915). As to pleas
in abatement, see Hutton & Co. v. Marx. ,supra note 127; Hyson v. Gen-
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A plea of plene administravit, if true, is complete protection
to the defendants against all personal liability.'29
The Court for good cause shown may at any time before
the time for pleading has elapsed extend the time for filing
pleas, affidavit and certificate of counsel, or may grant an
order allowing the defendant to withdraw pleas already
filed and file new pleas and affidavit, and such grant is in
,the sound discretion of the court and no appeal lies there-
from.180
A denial of signature does not have to be the subject of
a special plea, if the affidavit attached makes a denial, but
the affidavit cannot be amended to deny signature after the
specified time for filing an affidavit has expired, as such
an amendment would be to withdraw an admission of the
signature by the terms of the act. 8'
Pleas must be filed under a certificate by counsel stat-
ing: "I hereby certify that I advised the Defendant mak-
ing the above oath and filing said pleas, to do the same".
Counsel should not advise the filing of pleas when such pleas
will not support a valid defense. 82  It is not necessary to
xe-file pleas where the amended declaration is identical with
the original.3s
RULES OF COURT
The rules of Court affecting the Speedy Judgment Act
are rule number 9, regarding the service of copies of the
declaration, and rule number 49, providing that, "no order
to extend the time for filing pleas and affidavits in actions
under the Speedy Judgment Act shall be passed, pursuant
to the authority conferred by the act of 1894, ch. 173, except
after notice to the plaintiff, or his attorney of record".
eral Fire-Proofing Sup. Co., 117 Md. 230, 183 Atl. 244 (1912); and Lips-
comb v. Zink, supra note 25. For plea of set-off see Westminister Metal
and Foundry Co. v. Coffman, 123 Md. 619, 91 Atl. 716 (1914), and cases
cited therein.
129 May v. Wolverington, supra note 122.
1So Horner v. Plumley, 97 Md. 271. 54 Atl. 971 (1903).
131 Horner v. Plumley, supra note 130: Thorne v. Fox, 67 Md. 67, 8 Atl.
667 (1887) ; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Schuck, supra note 54.192 Chief Judge Dennis in Morris v. Reliable, Daily Record, Nov. 5th,
1928, allowed the plaintiff a counsel fee of one hundred dollars instead
of the minimum fee of twenty-five dollars, because the Defendant aban-
doned his defense after filing pleas.
183 Musher v. Perera, 8upra note 32.
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